Waterside Security at Energy Terminals: Lessons from Novorossiysk

April 7, 2026 · 6 min read · Maritime Security

Waterside security at energy terminals refers to the protection of port infrastructure — jetties, loading arms, storage tanks, pipelines, and berthed vessels — from threats originating from the water. The Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia's Novorossiysk oil terminal and the adjacent Sheskharis tank farm, which began in 2023 and have continued intermittently through 2026, provide the most consequential real-world case study of what happens when waterside security at a critical energy facility is tested by a determined adversary.

Novorossiysk handles approximately 800,000 barrels per day of Russian crude exports through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal and the Sheskharis facility. The drone attacks temporarily halted operations multiple times, damaged loading infrastructure, and forced Russia to implement extensive waterside defense measures including floating barriers, anti-drone nets, and dedicated naval patrol boats.

What Happened at Novorossiysk?

Beginning in August 2023, Ukrainian naval drones — unmanned surface vessels (USVs) similar to those that struck the Kerch Bridge — targeted the Novorossiysk port complex. Key incidents include:

August 2023: USV attack on Novorossiysk naval base damaged a Russian landing ship. Operations at the adjacent CPC oil terminal were suspended for several hours.
October 2023: Multiple USVs targeted the Sheskharis tank farm area. Russian naval forces claimed to have intercepted the drones, but satellite imagery showed damage to waterside infrastructure.
2024–2025: Intermittent attacks continued, with Russian authorities deploying increasing layers of defense including floating booms, anti-torpedo nets, and patrol vessels positioned in the outer approaches.
2026: Despite defensive measures, the threat persists. The CPC terminal has operated under enhanced security protocols continuously since the attacks began, with measurable impacts on loading rates and vessel turnaround times.

Why Does Novorossiysk Matter for Other Energy Terminals?

The Novorossiysk attacks are significant because they demonstrated three things that every energy terminal operator should internalize:

Maritime Drones Can Reach Distant Targets

The USVs launched against Novorossiysk traveled over 300 nautical miles from their launch points in Ukrainian-controlled waters. This demonstrated that waterside threats to energy terminals are not limited to local adversaries. Any actor with access to maritime drone technology — and the barrier to entry is low — can potentially strike targets hundreds of miles away.

Traditional Defenses Are Insufficient

Novorossiysk had standard port security measures in place — perimeter fencing, CCTV, vessel traffic monitoring, and the presence of Russian naval forces. None of these prevented the initial attacks. The drones were small, fast, and operated at water level, making them difficult to detect with conventional radar optimized for larger vessel traffic.

Economic Impact Is Immediate

The temporary shutdowns at Novorossiysk removed 800,000 barrels per day of crude oil from global markets during each disruption period. CPC blend crude prices spiked, and Kazakh and Russian crude loadings were delayed for weeks. The economic impact extended well beyond the terminal itself, affecting refiners in the Mediterranean and beyond.

What Are the Key Waterside Threats to Energy Terminals?

Beyond the drone threat demonstrated at Novorossiysk, energy terminals face several waterside security challenges:

Swimmer/diver attacks against underwater infrastructure including pipeline connections, jetty piling, and hull-mounted devices on berthed vessels.
Fast attack craft capable of delivering explosive payloads or armed personnel to terminal berths.
Underwater drones that can survey or attack subsurface infrastructure without surface detection.
Sabotage by insiders arriving via the waterside to circumvent landside access controls.
Environmental terrorism targeting oil handling infrastructure to cause deliberate spills.

How Should Energy Terminals Improve Waterside Security?

The lessons from Novorossiysk and other incidents point to several essential measures:

Multi-sensor surveillance. No single sensor can detect all waterside threats. Effective coverage requires radar (including small-target detection modes), electro-optical and infrared cameras, sonar and hydrophone arrays for underwater detection, and AIS monitoring for vessel identification. These sensors must be integrated into a common operating picture that allows operators to detect, classify, and track threats across all domains simultaneously.

Physical barriers. Floating booms, anti-drone nets, and underwater barriers can slow or stop certain threat types, but they are not substitutes for detection and response. Novorossiysk's deployment of physical barriers was a necessary but insufficient response.

Rapid response capability. Security teams must be able to respond to waterside intrusions within minutes. This requires dedicated patrol boats, trained response personnel, and rules of engagement that allow force when necessary. Many commercial terminals lack this capability entirely.

AI-driven threat detection. The volume of sensor data from a comprehensive waterside surveillance system exceeds human monitoring capacity. AI systems that can fuse multiple sensor feeds, classify targets automatically, and alert operators only to genuine threats are essential for maintaining effective coverage 24/7.

Integration with ISPS frameworks. Waterside security measures must be integrated into the terminal's ISPS facility security plan, with defined procedures for escalation from Security Level 1 to Level 3 based on waterside threat indicators.

Key Takeaways

The Novorossiysk attacks demonstrated that maritime drones can strike energy terminals hundreds of miles from their launch points, with immediate economic consequences.
Traditional port security measures — CCTV, perimeter fencing, vessel traffic monitoring — are insufficient against small, fast-moving waterside threats.
Effective waterside security requires multi-sensor surveillance, physical barriers, rapid response capability, and AI-driven threat detection.
Energy terminal operators must reassess their waterside security posture in light of the demonstrated drone threat and invest in detection and response capabilities.
The ISPS Code framework provides a starting point, but compliance alone is insufficient — terminals must go beyond regulatory minimums to address evolving threats.