Don't Expect Traffic Flooding Back to Hormuz, Clarksons Says: Market Analysis
Clarksons Research, the world's leading shipping data and analytics firm, has issued a market briefing warning the industry not to expect a rapid return to pre-crisis traffic volumes through the Strait of Hormuz. The analysis, published on April 4, 2026, projects that even under an optimistic diplomatic scenario, full traffic normalization could take six to nine months — and that some structural shifts in trade routing may become permanent.
The Clarksons assessment matters because it is grounded in vessel tracking data, charter market activity, and insurance market signals rather than geopolitical speculation. For port operators planning berth capacity, staffing levels, and security postures, this data-driven outlook is more actionable than diplomatic optimism.
What Does the Clarksons Data Show?
Daily Hormuz transits averaged approximately 80 commercial movements before the crisis. At the peak of the shutdown in mid-March, that number fell below 10. As of early April, transits have recovered to approximately 35 per day, but the composition of traffic has shifted dramatically.
Crude tankers account for roughly 60% of current transits, up from their historical share of approximately 40%. LNG carriers, which previously represented 15% of traffic, are almost entirely absent. Container vessels and dry bulk carriers together account for less than 10% of current movements, down from approximately 25% pre-crisis.
Clarksons projects three recovery scenarios:
Optimistic (diplomatic resolution by Q3 2026): Traffic recovers to 60-65 transits per day by September 2026, reaching 75+ by year-end. LNG carriers return gradually, but some Qatari volumes permanently shift to Cape routing.
Base case (prolonged tension, no escalation): Traffic stabilizes at 40-50 transits per day through 2026, with crude tankers dominant. Container and dry bulk traffic largely reroutes permanently.
Pessimistic (renewed escalation): Traffic drops back below 20 per day, insurance backstop is tested, and alternative routing becomes the default for all cargo types.
Why Won't Traffic Return Quickly?
Several structural factors prevent a rapid recovery even if diplomatic conditions improve.
Contractual commitments to alternative routes. Charterers and cargo owners who signed time charter agreements or contracts of affreightment based on Cape routing cannot simply revert to Hormuz transit. These contracts typically run for 6 to 12 months, locking in the longer route regardless of strait conditions.
Insurance inertia. War risk underwriters who imposed Hormuz exclusions or surcharges will not remove them instantly. The London market typically requires 30 to 90 days of stable conditions before revising war risk classifications, and even then, elevated premiums may persist for a year or more.
Operational reconfiguration. Ports, terminals, and logistics providers that adapted to Cape routing have invested in adjusted scheduling, staffing, and equipment deployment. Reverting those changes carries its own costs and disruptions.
What Should Port Operators Take from This Analysis?
The Clarksons briefing reinforces a message that experienced terminal operators already understand: plan for the most likely scenario, not the best case. If traffic recovery will be gradual, then the current operating environment — with its mixed vessel populations, unpredictable scheduling, and elevated security requirements — is likely to persist for months.
How Does This Affect Vessel Demand and Charter Rates?
The extended voyage distances created by Cape routing are absorbing additional vessel capacity. Clarksons estimates that the Hormuz crisis has effectively removed the equivalent of 8% of the global tanker fleet from productive service simply through longer sailing times. This tonne-mile effect is supporting elevated charter rates across all tanker segments and is unlikely to reverse quickly.
What Questions Should Terminal Operators Ask?
Which of their regular customers have locked in alternative routing? What is the expected timeline for those contracts to expire? Are there new customers seeking berth access because their usual terminals are congested with rerouted traffic? These commercial intelligence questions should inform capacity planning for the next two to three quarters.
Conclusion
Clarksons' analysis is a corrective to the assumption that diplomatic progress will quickly translate into operational normalization at the Strait of Hormuz. The data points to a slow recovery shaped by contractual, insurance, and operational inertia. Terminal operators who plan for gradual change rather than sudden normalization will be better positioned to manage the months ahead.